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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature 0f the Case

The

Bromund

in this matter,

(hereinafter “Appellant”),

the military

When he

parties

0n March
2

retired.

18, 1991,

Kristina

Bromund

were married on October 26, 1990.1 Appellant

where he continued

On November

(hereinafter “Respondent”)

17,

and Kurt

later

joined

his active duty service until April 30,

2018

2008, a Judgment and Decree 0f Divorce (hereinafter

“Decree”) was entered by default.3 The dispute, and the underlying basis of Appellant’s appeal

0n the division 0f Appellant’s military retirement beneﬁts and the formula by

herein, centers

Which Respondent’s share was

to

be determined.

B. Course 0f Proceedings

Respondent ﬁled a Complaint for Divorce (hereinafter “Complaint”) 0n August 27,

2008f Paragraph

10.

RETIREMENT ASSET, of the Complaint read as follows:

be awarded her community interest share 0f Defendant’s eventual
military retirement beneﬁtss Her share should be determined by the following
Plaintiff should

formula:

Number 0f days 0f the marriage
Number 0f days 0f Defendant’s active
The Court should
asset

is

X
duty

l
2

X

Net disposable
retirement beneﬁt

retain jurisdiction over this subject matter until such time as this

successfully allocated pursuant to a domestic relations or equivalent order,

The parties should be required t0 keep each other mutually current
0n mailing addresses s0 that they may smoothly effectuate the distribution 0f this
asset promptly upon its inception. Defendant should be required t0 keep Plaintiff
timely apprised of the effective date of his retirement from the military.6
if necessary.

.7
.3 9.
p. 19-27, 39.

.7-17.
6

1d.
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In the Complaint,

7

that the separate

community share 0f military retirement beneﬁts, of the

property, including the

between them.

Respondent prayed for Judgment

The

default

Decree was entered 0n November

17,

and community

parties

2008.

be divided

Paragraph

9.

“RETIREMENT ASSET” ordered as follows:
Plaintiff is

awarded her community interest share of Defendant’s Mata] military
8
Her share 0f said beneﬁt shall be determined by the

retirement beneﬁts.

following formula:

Number 0f days 0f the marriage
Number 0f days 0f Defendant’s active
The Court should
asset

is

X
duty

l

X

2

Net disposable
retirement beneﬁt

retain jurisdiction over this subject matter until such time as this

successfully allocated pursuant t0 a domestic relations 0r equivalent order,

The parties should be required t0 keep each other mutually current
0n mailing addresses s0 that they may smoothly effectuate the distribution 0f this
asset promptly upon its inception. Defendant shall keep Plaintiff timely apprised
0f the effective date 0f his retirement from the military.9
if necessary.

On August

8,

2018, Respondent caused t0 be ﬁled a Motion for Contempt regarding

Appellant’s failure t0 comply with the Decree“) Speciﬁcally, the Appellant refused t0 provide

Respondent With his current address 0r the effective date 0f his retirement from the military as
required pursuant t0 the Decree.“

duty on April 30, 2018.

According t0 the Appellant he retired from active military

12

Although, not appearing in the Clerk’s Record 0n Appeal, Appellant ﬁled a Motion for

Entry 0f Order Clarifying Division ofMilitary Retirement and a

on January

7

R., p. 21,

emphasis added.

R., pp. 21—22.

1°
11

in support thereof

2019. Respondent ﬁled an Opposition t0 Motion for Order Clariﬁdng Division 0f

R., pp. 7—17.

8

9

2,

memorandum

R., pp. 28—29.
R., pp. 28—29, 42.

12

Id.
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Military Retirement 0n February 28, 2019.13

Following a hearing 0n the same, the magistrate

entered an Order Clariﬁ/ing Division ofMilitary Retirement (hereinafter “Order”) 0n

2019.

14

The Magistrate Court made a ﬁnding

interest in Appellant’s military retirement

that the

On

12,

formula utilized for valuing the community

beneﬁts as written in the Decree was the “time rule

method,” Which was an approved method for apportioning the beneﬁts
entered in 2008.

March

at the

time the decree was

15

April 18, 2019, the Appellant ﬁled a Notice 0f Appeal, appealing the same and

identiﬁed a single issue 0n appeal: “The Magistrate Court’s characterization and division 0f
Petitioner’s[sic] military retirement

pay

in such a

manner

as t0

award

his former spouse that

portion of his retirement pay attributable to his increase in rank after the date 0f the divorce?”

On

October

March
Court.

12,

18,

2019, in

2019 Order.”

its

Opinion 0n Appeal, the District Court afﬁrmed the magistrate’s

On November

27, 2019, Appellant ﬁled his Notice

oprpeal

to this

18

II.

ISSUES

ON APPEAL

A. Did the Magistrate err in concluding that military retirement beneﬁts

earned after the date 0f divorce are a divisible community property
asset?”

B. Did the Magistrate err in concluding that the

1408, which

became

amendment

t0 10 U.S.C. §

effective after entry of the decree but before the

Appellant’s retirement from the military, did not deﬁne the portion 0f the
13

14
15

Not

in the Clerk’s

Record on Appeal.

R., pp. 30—33, 59—62.
R., p. 31. “Conversely, ‘[t]he time rule values the

community

interest in the retirement

beneﬁts as one-half of the

ﬁaction of the years of the community service under the plan, divided by the total years 0f service.’” Barley v.
Smith, 149 Idaho 171, 184-185, 233 P.3d 102, 115-116 (2010) (quoting Hunt v. Hunt, 137 Idaho 18, 21, 43 P.3d
777, 780 (2002)).
16

17
18
19

R., pp. 34—35.
R., pp. 41—46.
R., pp. 48-50.

March

12,

2020, Briefoprpellant,
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p. 4.

military retirement that constitutes

community property?”

C. Did the District Court err in concluding that the

amendment

t0 10 U.S.C.

§ 1408 does not apply t0 a decree of divorce entered prior t0 the date of

amendment when
amendment?”

the statute’s
after the

the military

member

is still

0n active duty

D. Did the Magistrate error in holding the decree 0f divorce reﬂected the

mutual

parties’

intent

regarding

division

Appellant’s

0f

military

retirement was harmless error?22

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Standard 0f Review.

On

appeal of a decision rendered by a District Court, acting in

Supreme Court

it

on appeal. Barley

102 (2010); Idaho Dept. OfHealth and Welfare
v.

appellate capacity, the

Will directly review the District Court’s decision t0 determine

correctly decided the issues presented t0

Lohman

its

v.

v.

whether

Smith, 149 Idaho 171, 223 P.3d

Doe, 148 Idaho 124, 219 P.3d 448 (2009). In

Flynn, the Idaho Supreme Court articulated the standard of review as follows:

When

reviewing the decision 0f a

district court acting in its appellate

capacity

over the magistrate division, the Supreme Court reviews the magistrate judge's
but With due regard

decision independently

0f,

appellate decision. See

Swanson

(2000); Balderson

v.

v.

for, the district court's

Swanson, 134 Idaho 512, 515, 5 P.3d 973, 976

supported by substantial, competent evidence in the record.
court's

The lower
showing

intermediate

Balderson, 127 Idaho 48, 51, 896 P.2d 956, 959 (1995). The

ﬁndings of fact by the magistrate judge will be upheld by

trial

conclusions

0f

law,

this

Court

this
Id.

exercises

court’s discretionary decisions Will be upheld

that the court

abused

its

563, 944 P.2d 695, 698 (1997).

discretion.

When

Quiring

v.

Court

if

they are

With respect
free

to the

review.

Id.

0n appeal absent a

Quiring, 130 Idaho 560,

an exercise 0f discretion

is

reviewed 0n

appeal, the Court inquires: (1) Whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue

2°

1d.
21

Id.
22

Id.
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it

as one 0f discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the boundaries of such

discretion

and

(3)

and consistently With any

whether the court reached

legal standards applicable to speciﬁc choices;

its

decision

by

exercise of reason. Id. (citations

omitted).

Lohman

v.

Flynn, 139 Idaho 312, 78 P.3d 379 (Idaho 2003).
IV.

ARGUMENT
The Appellant’s Brief identiﬁed

his four (4) issues

on appeal. However, the Argument

section of Appellant’s Brief appears to diverge from the four (4) issues
stated therein. Rather than attempt t0 guess Appellant’s intent,

on appeal

as previously

Respondent has structured

this

response argument by addressing each of the four (4) issues Appellant speciﬁcally stated were 0n
appeal.

A. The Magistrate Court did not err in concluding that military retirement beneﬁts

earned after the date 0f divorce were a

divisible

The Magistrate Court properly determined

community property

that the “time rule

method”

asset.

for calculating the

value of Appellant’s military retirement beneﬁts at the time the Decree was entered and as set
forth in Respondent/Petitioner’s

Complaint for Divorce was in accordance with the law

time the Decree was entered.” Appellant’s appeal seems to be an attempt t0 g0 back and
the division of

community

interest

in his

at the

litigate

eventual military retirement beneﬁts. Both the

Complaint and the Decree expressly provided for the division 0f future (“eventual”) military
retirement beneﬁts earned after the divorce as a divisible

community property

asset.24

The

Appellant’s opportunity t0 contest the formula for calculating the value of his eventual military
retirement beneﬁts

23

would have been

after

Hunt

he acknowledged service of Respondent/Petitioner’s

v. Hunt, 137 Idaho 18 at 22, 43 P.3d 777 at 781 (2002), wherein the Idaho Supreme Court approved the time
method, “the magistrate acted within the applicable rules and did not abuse its discretion by choosing to apply
the time rule instead 0f the accrued beneﬁts method.”

rule
24

R., pp. 9—10,

1m

9, 10; p. 13; p.
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21—23, 1m

8, 9.

Complaint for Divorce. For reasons known only to Appellant, he did nothing to challenge or
contest any provision 0r relief requested in the Complaint for Divorce and 0n

November

17,

2008, the Decree mirroring the same was entered pursuant t0 an Orderfor Default.” Likewise,

Appellant did not timely

move

and Respondent’s attempt

to set aside or appeal the

t0 enforce the

Decree as

it

ﬁnal Decree. Only after his retirement,

relates t0 the

interest in his military retirement pay, did the Appellant decide

in the

payment of her community

he wanted t0 change the language

Decree to beneﬁt himself based on the 2017 National Authorization Act.
Title

control

its

1,

Chapter 16 0f the Idaho Code

processes and orders, so as t0

1603. This

is

sets forth the

powers 0f the courts

make them conformable

t0

“amend and

law and justice.”

supported by relevant case law holding “a divorce decree

jurisdiction exists to

to

is

I.C. § 1-

ﬁnal and “no

modify property provisions of a divorce decree.”26 Furthermore, “every

court has the authority t0 enforce

The Decree entered

its

orders as issued.”27

in this matter

on November

17,

2008 ordered, adjudged and decreed

as follows:

9.

RETIREMENT ASSET.

Plaintiff is

awarded her community

interest share

of

Defendant’s eventual military retirement beneﬁts. Her share 0f said beneﬁt shall be

determined by the following formula:

Number of days of the marriage
Number 0f days 0f Defendant’s
active duty

X

l

X

2

t0

Decree Which further described the community

property to be divided between the parties, t0 include the

26

R., pp. 7—27.

Vierstm

v.

Vierstm, 153 Idaho 873, 880, 292 P.3d 264, 271 (2012).

27

Id.
28

R., p.21.
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retirement beneﬁts

28

The Decree included an Exhibit

25

Net disposable

“Community

share of military

retirement

beneﬁts?” Based on

the relevant Idaho

Magistrate Court had the authority t0 enforce
division 0f the

community

With regard
appeal,

it is

interest share

Once a

lawsuit

decided, the

is

in this matter.

same

in this matter, including the

0f Appellant’s argument and the relief sought by his

important for the Court t0 consider

pay

own Decree

as cited, the

0f Appellant’s eventual military retirement beneﬁts.

to the overall tenor

division of military retirement

its

Code and supporting case law

how

the doctrine of res judicata applies t0 the

Res judicata

is

issue or an issue arising

deﬁned

as,

“a thing adjudicated.

from the ﬁrst issue cannot be

contested again.”30

Here, both the Magistrate and District courts concluded that the military retirement

beneﬁts were lawfully divided in accordance with the law
entered on

November

appeal the

November

in this matter

17, 2008. Additionally,

17,

at the

time the ﬁnal Decree was

because the Appellant made n0 attempt t0 timely

2008 judgment, the decision therein

is

ﬁnal. Thus, the beneﬁts at issue

were already lawfully and validly divided.“ The Appellant

getting a second bite at the apple just because the

law changed

t0 his

is

precluded from

beneﬁt years

after the fact.

Although somewhat different factually than the instant case, courts around the country
have uniformly held that McCarty and Mansell are not retroactive.

32

Interestingly enough,

Appellant relies heavily on these earlier cases in his brief but neglects t0 address this issue 0f

29
3°
31

R., p. 23.

Res judicata,

BLACK’S

LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed.

1910).

960 (2004) (stating federally preempted
beneﬁts can be divided 0n a theory 0f res judicata; relying expressly 0n the post-remand decision in Mansell); 1n re
See Shelton

v.

Shelton, 78 P.3d 507 (Nev. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S.

Marriage 0f Curis, 9

Cal. Rptr.

2d 145

(Cal. Ct.

App. 1992); Evans

v.

Evans, 541 A.2d 648 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.

1988); In re Zrubek, 149 B.R. 631 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1993).
32

See, e.g., 1n re Chandler, 805 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.s. 1049 (1987); Armstrong v.
Armstrong, 696 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983); Brown v. Robertson, 606 F. Supp. 494

(W.D. Tex. 1985); Ford v. Ford, 783 S.W.2d 879 (Ark. Ct. App. 1990); Allcock v. Allcock, 437 N.E.2d 392 (Ill. Ct.
App. 1982); Toupal v. Toupal, 790 P.2d 1055 (NM. Ct. App. 1990); Baxter v. Ruddle, 794 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1990);
In re Marriage 0f Reinauer, 946 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997), 0n reh’g in part, (May 22, 1997); Elliott v.
Elliott, 797 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990); Berry v. Berry, 870 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989), judgment
rev’d, 786 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1990), writ granted, (Mar. 28, 1990); Maxwell v. Maxwell, 796 P.2d 403 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990).
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retroactivity.

Similarly, there

is

nothing in Howell that suggests that the Supreme Court intended

t0 invalidate 0r otherwise render unenforceable prior valid

judgments.” Applying the December

2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2017 (“2017

23,

retroactively t0 ﬁnal decrees 0f divorce

discussed herein.

remains undisputed

It

would

NDAA”) amendment

create serious public policy implications as

that, prior t0 the

passage of the 2017

NDAA,

it

was

within the magistrate’s discretion to divide military retirement beneﬁts according t0 the “time
rule,” as

B.

was done

in this case.

The Magistrate did not err
which became

effective

in concluding that the

after

amendment

t0 10 U.S.C. § 1408,

entry of the decree but before the Appellant’s

retirement from the military, did not deﬁne the portion 0f the military retirement
that constitutes

community property.

In his appeal brief, Appellant contends there

is

a dispute between the parties as t0 the

deﬁnition 0f the military retirement pay asset. In support 0f his appeal, the Appellant relies
heavily on U.S. Supreme Court case Howell

Howell

v.

Howell

t0 support his

v.

H0well.34 However, the Appellant’s reliance on

argument for the retroactive application 0f 2017

NDAA

Sec.

641(b) t0 the ﬁnal decree of divorce entered in this case more than ten (10) years ago
misplaced, as

it is

akin t0 comparing “apples t0 oranges.” In Howell

v.

is

Howell, the U.S. Supreme

Court held that Where a veteran waives retirement pay to receive service-related disability
beneﬁts, federal law preempts state courts from ordering the veteran to indemnify their divorced

spouse for the loss 0f that spouse’s portion of the veteran’s retirement pay.” Here, the issue has
nothing t0 do with service-related disability beneﬁts which, Respondent acknowledges are not

33

:‘5‘

Howell

v.

Howell, 137

s. Ct.

1400 (2017).

137 S.Ct. 1400, 197 L.Ed. 2d 781 (2017).
1d.
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considered t0 be community property.36

The

C.

District

Court correctly concluded that the amendment

t0 10 U.S.C. § 1408 does

not apply t0 a decree 0f divorce entered prior t0 the date of the statute’s

when

the military

member is

still

amendment

0n active duty after the amendment.

Appellant argues that the Decree must comply with the requirements of the 2017
regarding the formula for determining the division 0f the entitlement.”

NDAA,

ignores 2017

Sec. 641(b)

NDAA

However, Appellant

which provides:

Application of Amendments.--The amendments

made by

subsection (a) shall
apply with respect t0 any division of property as part of a ﬁnal decree of divorce,
dissolution, annulment, or legal separation involving a

member of

Armed

the

Forces t0 which section 1408 of title 10, United States Code, applies that becomes

ﬁnal alter the date of the enactment of this Act. (emphasis added).
Plainly stated, the 2017

divorce that

December

NDAA’s amendment

become ﬁnal

to 10 U.S.C. §

after the date of the enactment 0f the Act,

23, 2016.38 Appellant ignores the explicit language in

that the “frozen beneﬁts rule” does not affect the

Senate

1408 applies only

Armed

Services committee’s report,

it

2017

Decree entered in

was

this

to decrees

of

Which became law on

NDAA as

stated above,

case.” According to the

the committee’s intent that the

amendment

to

10 U.S.C. § 1408 t0 modify the computation 0f the division of military retired pay in a divorce

decree would

n_0t affect

existing divorce settlements.

Part II-Other Matters

Use 0f member’s current pay grade and years 0f service, rather than ﬁnal
retirement pay grade and years 0f service, in a division 0f property involving
disposable retired pay (sec. 642)
The committee recommends a provision
36

Mansell

v.

that

would amend

section 1408 0f

title

Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989). The U.S. Supreme Court held that federal law prevents state courts

ﬁom

dividing veteran’s or military disability beneﬁts under a theory of community property or equitable distribution. 490

U.S.
37
38

39

at

594-95.

Later as revised in Section 624 0fthe

NDAA 0f 201 8.

https://www.congress.g0V/1 14/plaws/pub1328/PLAW-1 14publ328.pdf,
https://Www.congress.gov/1 14/p1aws/publ328/PLAW-1 14publ328.pdf,
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December
December

23, 2016, 130
23, 2016.

STAT. 2164.

United States Code, to modify the division 0f military retired pay in a divorce
decree to the amount the member would be entitled based upon the member’s pay
grade and years 0f service at the time of the divorce rather than at the time of
10,

retirement with the spousal share 0f the retired pay computed 0n the retired pay as

adjusted

the annual increases in military pay. This provision

by

is

prospective

only and would not aﬁect existing divorce settlements. (emphasis added).40
Likewise,

the

amendment

House 0f Representatives Conference Report 114-840, provided

t0 10 U.S.C. §

that

the

1408 that “would be prospective only and would not affect existing

divorce settlements.”41

While the law may have evolved

in the interim, the fact is the revision relied

Appellant was not intended t0 apply retroactively.

thousands 0f decrees t0 be litigated anew, and
case, the divorce

its

was ﬁnalized pursuant

Section 624 revision in 2018.

this

t0 the

T0 do

so

was not

would be tantamount

upon by

t0 allowing

the intention of the revision.

Decree entered years before the 2017

Thus, the Court in this matter was within

its

In this

NDAA or

jurisdiction t0

honor the formula for calculating the division of the eventual military retirement beneﬁts as
forth in the Decree.

Both the magistrate and

community property share of
calculated using the time rule

district courts

set

properly determined Respondent’s

the disposable military retirement beneﬁts at issue

would be

method.“

Test for Retroactivity.

The Supreme Court decision
t0 resolve questions

law
is

40
41

42

43

44

0f statutory

in effect at the time

it

in

Landgraf v. USI Film Products

retroactivity.43

“The ﬁrst

is

the rule that ‘a court

renders the decision.’”44 “The second

not favored in the law,

3

and

its

sets forth a two-part test

is

the

axiom

is

to apply the

that ‘[r]etroactiVity

interpretative corollary that ‘congressional enactments

https.'//www. congressgov/I I 4/crpt/srpt255/CRPT-I I 4srpt255.pdf p. 1 68.

https://asc.army.mil/web/wp-content/uploads/201 9/03/NDAA-I 7.pdf, pp. I 056-5 7.

Number 0f days 0f marriage
Number of days 0f Respondent’s

6 597
active duty

X

1

=

33%

2

9,905

Landgmfv. USI Film Products, 511 U.s. 244
Id. (quoting

Bradley

v.

at 280 (1994).
School Bd. ofRichmona’, 416 U.S. 696, 71
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1,

94

S.Ct. 2006,

40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974)).

and

administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires
this result.’”45 Id.

When

a case implicates a federal statute enacted after the events in

suit,

the

whether Congress has expressly prescribed the
statute’s proper reach. If Congress has done so, 0f course, there is n0 need to
resort t0 judicial default rules. When, however, the statute contains n0 such
express command, the court must determine Whether the new statute would have
retroactive effect, i.e., Whether it would impair rights a party possessed When he
acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, 0r impose new duties With
court’s ﬁrst task

respect

is

t0 determine

transactions

to

completed.

already

retroactively, our traditional

If

the

presumption teaches that

would operate

statute
it

does not govern absent

clear congressional intent favoring such a result.46

Here, 2017

NDAA

Sec. 641(b)’s

unambiguous language and the corresponding committee and

conference reports regarding the same establish that Congress “expressly prescribed the statute’s

reach”

—

t0 decrees

of divorce ﬁnalized after December 23, 2016.47 Therefore

2008 Judgment and Decree 0f Divorce.48 The Appellant cannot

Landgraf s two-part

satisfy the ﬁrst

would likewise be unsuccessful. The Supreme Court

that the test for retroactivity

events completed before

its

“whether the

enactment.”49

new

provision attaches

A retroactive

vested rights acquired under existing laws, 0r creates a
97

attaches a

new

45

Bowen

46

Id. (quoting

50

disability.

v.

prong 0f

test.

In spite 0f the above, if analysis of the second prong of the Landgraftest

the Appellant

Court need

NDAA applies retroactively the

not “resort to judicial default rules” to determine whether 2017
parties’

this

This inquiry

is

statute is

new

in

Lindh

new

legal

v.

were necessary,

Murphy, notes

consequences to

one that “takes away 0r impairs

obligation, imposes a

new

be guided by “considerations 0f

Georgetown Univ. Hosp, 488 U.S. 204, 208, 109

S.Ct. 468,

fair

duty, or

notice,

102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988)).

1d. at 280.

47

1d.
48

Id.
49
50

Landgmfv. U51 Film Products, 511 U.s. 244, 269—70
Sturges

v.

(1994).

Carter, 114 U.S. 511, 519 (1885); see Lohfv. Casey, 330 F. Supp. 356, 359 (D. C010. 1971) (retroactive

legislation “take[s]

away 0r impair
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rights acquired

under prior law 0r

* * *

creates

new

disabilities

With respect t0

.

.

reasonable rehance, and settled expectatlons.”
Lastly, Appellant’s 11th

51

hour argument that the District Court’s interpretation 0f the 2017

NDAA is inconsistent with the full language of the statute because the Decree was not the “ﬁnal”
order dividing military retirement

is

wholly unpersuasive. To bolster his case, the Appellant

contends that the “ﬁnal” order dividing military retirement was the entry of the Order Clarzﬁ/ing
Division ofMilz'tary Retirement, Which course, was after the

amendment was

enacted.

One might

argue that the only reason Appellant sought clariﬁcation from the Magistrate Court t0 begin with

was

t0

ﬁnd

a path around the limitation 0f retroactive application 0f the

entered prior t0

December

23, 2016. Regardless,

it is

clear

amendment

t0 decrees

from the Order Clariﬁ/ing Division 0f

Military Retirement that the underlying ﬁnal Decree remained unchanged. The subsequent
“clariﬁcation” did nothing to modify or
calculate Respondent’s

amend

the effect 0r validity 0f the “time rule” formula to

community property share 0f the disposable

upon Appellant’s eventual

military retirement beneﬁts

retirement.

D. The Magistrate did not error in holding the decree 0f divorce reﬂected the parties’

mutual intent regarding division of Appellant’s military retirement was harmless
error.

The Appellant takes

made

the

ﬁnding

that the parties intended to utilize the time rule

stipulated Judgment.

by

stipulation.

issue With the Magistrate’s Order, wherein the Court mistakenly

The

It is

clear

from the record

that the

method

as evidenced in the

Decree was entered by default and not

District Court properly concluded:

The mischaracterization does not

affect the

outcome.

See I.R.C.P. 61:

Harmless

error.

past transactions”), aff’d,
51

Landgmﬁ

511 U.s.

at

No

error in either the admission or the exclusion 0f

466 F.2d 618 (10th

270.
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Cir. 1972).

evidence and no error 0r defect in any ruling or order or in anything done
or omitted
trial

the court 0r any of the parties

by

is

ground for granting a new

or setting aside a verdict 0r for vacating, modifying, 0r otherwise

disturbing a judgment 0r order, unless refusal t0 take such action appears
to the court inconsistent

With substantial justice. The court

at

every stage

0f the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding

which does not

The judgment was

affect the substantial rights

of the

parties.

consistent With the formula set forth in the complaint.

The

Appellant was served with the complaint and did not contest the formula.

V.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Respondent
to Idaho

Code

is

entitled to her attorney fees

§ 12-121,

Idaho Rules 0f Family

and costs associated with

Law

this

Procedure 901-909, and

all

appeal pursuant
other applicable

state law.

VI.

CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Respondent asks
Magistrate Court’s
District Court’s

March

12,

this

Court t0 deny Appellant’s appeal and afﬁrm the

2019 Order Clarzﬁ/ing Division 0f Military Retirement and the

Opinion 0n Appeal, dated October

18, 2019.

DATED this 9th day of April, 2020.
DINIUS

LAW

/s/Kevin E. Dinius

By:

Kevin E. Dinius
Sarah Hallock—Jayne
Attorneys for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
the undersigned, hereby certify that

I,

0n the

9th

day 0f April, 2020,

electronically through the iCourt Idaho eFiling System,

I

ﬁled the foregoing

which caused the following

parties 0r

counsel t0 be served by electronic means, as more fully reﬂected on the notice 0f electronic
ﬁling:

John A. Miller

BOISE
250

s.

Boise,

LAW GROUP

5th St, Suite 850

ID 83702

D
D
D
D
g

US Mail
Overnight Mail

Hand Delivery
Facsimile

/S/Kevin E. Dinius
for

DINIUS

cm/T:\Clients\H\Henrickson, Kristina 24616\Appeal\Respondent's Brieﬁdocx
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